Reacciones mixtas a BCE

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

La decisión de política monetaria del Banco Central Europeo (BCE) y la conferencia de prensa de su presidente, Mario Draghi, obtuvieron reacciones mixtas de mercados y los analistas. NYT resume los puntos principales y las preguntas que faltan por responder. Tim Duy critica fuertemente al BCE. El País interpreta que Draghi está empujando a España a otro rescate. Paul Carrel y Eva Kuehnen de Reuters, y Claire Jones y Joseph Cotterill de FT explican los posibles puntos positivos y la difícil posición en la que se encuentra Draghi. Genevieve Signoret escribirá sus propias observaciones mañana en nuestro blog (vea un avance de sus comentarios en su cuenta de Twitter).

Para los observadores de la política monetaria, recomendamos hoy más que nunca leer la sesión de preguntas y respuestas y ver el video.

NYT resume los puntos principales y las preguntas que faltan por responder:

Mr. Draghi signaled that the bank, in what would actually be a marked departure from current policy, was willing to start buying government bonds to hold down the borrowing costs of troubled euro zone countries like Spain. But the bank put the onus on political leaders to move first, and left open some crucial questions about how quickly and forcefully it would seek to tame unruly financial markets.

Coming almost exactly a week after Mr. Draghi incited a market rally by pledging to “do whatever it takes to preserve the euro zone,” his admission Thursday that whatever it takes might actually take weeks or months resulted in a Draghi rout.

Stocks indexes started falling quickly and deeply in Europe almost as soon as Mr. Draghi began speaking at a news conference. And the downdraft carried over to Wall Street after the American markets opened. Borrowing costs for Spain and Italy, as measured by the yields on their bonds, spiked back up almost to the levels they were at before the Draghi rally started a week earlier.

[But] in many respects the bank’s statement Thursday was its strongest declaration yet that it would not tolerate excessive borrowing costs for euro zone countries. It is just that the giddiest of investors were not ready for a return to technospeak. The bank is prepared to “undertake outright open-market operations of a size adequate to reach its objective,” Mr. Draghi said Thursday. Interest rates demanded by investors “that are related to fears of the reversibility of the euro are unacceptable,” Mr. Draghi said, “and they need to be addressed in a fundamental manner.”

[…] Investors may also be facing the reality, no surprise, that the bank’s attempts to lower borrowing costs for Spain and Italy could be constrained by continuing German opposition to bond buying. On Thursday, Mr. Draghi acknowledged that Jens Weidmann, president of the German central bank, opposed the general statement on bond purchases that the other 22 members of the European Central Bank’s governing council had agreed to when they met earlier in the day.

At that same meeting, the governing council decided not to lower the central bank’s benchmark interest rate. The bank’s announcement of that news 45 minutes before the start of Mr. Draghi’s news conference had no effect on the financial markets, probably because that rate is already at a record low of 0.75 percent, and any further reduction would be more symbolic than meaningful.

In describing the broad outlines of a bond-buying program, Mr. Draghi promised that it would differ from the central bank’s previous attempts to hold down borrowing costs. In a break from the past, the European Central Bank now plans to disclose which bonds it is buying from which countries. So far, the bank has disclosed only the total amount, which has been $256.7 billion at the current exchange rate, since 2010

But Mr. Draghi left some crucial questions open, like whether the bank would stop treating itself as a preferred creditor on the bonds it holds or if it would instead be willing to absorb any losses alongside private holders of government bonds. That would be in contrast to the bailout of Greece this year, when the European Central Bank, European Commission and International Monetary Fund declined to take losses on their Greek bonds, which private investors were forced to absorb.

The bank plans to address the issue, but Mr. Draghi said more study was needed. Likewise, Mr. Draghi said the bank’s internal committees would have to study whether the bank would continue to withdraw as much money from the euro zone economy as it spent buying bonds, a policy designed to avoid the appearance it is printing money.

Tim Duy critica fuertemente al BCE.

An epic policy failure by the ECB. Not only is the ECB willing to let the Eurocrisis simmer for another month, but their communication strategy is abysmal. Draghi very desperately needs to be more aware of the impact of his comments. As for the ECB statement, I think it says that the ECB is a second line of defense, and they will act reluctantly only after the EFSF/ESM fund is activated. This seems to imply a formal bailout request as a precondition to ECB action. We really need to see more clarification in the weeks ahead about what the ECB sees as the ordering of policy actions in the Eurozone. The order implied in this statement seems to me like a commitment to continued economic stagnation.

El País también interpreta que Draghi empuja a España a otro rescate:

El presidente del eurobanco dejó claro que habrá ayuda para los países que sufren una escalada insoportable en sus costes de financiación, sí. Pero para que esta llegue, serán los Gobiernos los que tendrán que solicitar al fondo de rescate europeo que se lance a comprar deuda. Solo entonces intervendrá el BCE. Así, de una tacada, Draghi desplaza toda la presión hacia los países al borde de la intervención. Es decir, hacia España.

Esta interpretación viene de las siguientes palabras de Draghi en la conferencia de prensa:

“The adherence of governments to their commitments”, namely fiscal reforms, structural reforms and so on, “and the fulfillment by the EFSF/ESM of their role are necessary conditions” for some actions on the ECB’s side. So, the first thing is that governments have to go to the EFSF, because, as I said several times, the ECB cannot replace governments, or cannot replace the action that other institutions have to take on the fiscal side.

Otras reacciones fueron más positivas. Paul Carrel y Eva Kuehnen de Reuters, por ejemplo, declara que Draghi abrió la puerta a una nueva era de política monetaria:

Although the Italian stuffed his “guidance” on fresh ECB action with caveats and conditions, he opened the door to a new round of policy action that could even involve quantitative easing – a bold step the ECB has previously shunned.

Claire Jones de Financial Times dice que Draghi debe pasar por un campo minado:

A combative Mario Draghi had three aims on Thursday: the first was to convince markets that his pledge to preserve the euro was genuine; the second was to keep the pressure on the Spanish and Italian government and the third was to contain a possible backlash from the Bundesbank.

Y Joseph Cotterill de FT Alphaville pregunta, ¿Draghi de verdad fue un desastre?

Comentarios: Deje su comentario.