Johnson, Waldman, Chandler recorren, evalúan propuestas para zona euro
Genevieve Signoret
Tres blogueros nos ayudan a procesar propuestas recientes para la zona del euro: Simon Johnson, Steve Randy Waldman y Marc Chandler.
Simon Johnson (Bloomberg)
IMF Bazooka Is Between Meaningless, Dangerous. La solución “Gran Bazuka FMI” es la propuesta de que el FMI, con fondos de países emergentes o del BCE, contribuya a fondear el rescate de Italia. El autor la considera inútil porque el FMI no tiene suficientes fondos. Y peligrosa por ser ilusoria.
Financial rescue plans for Europe are becoming ever more fanciful. Increasingly, policy analysts in Europe and the U.S. turn to the International Monetary Fund to provide what is termed “the bazooka” — meaning a lot of money underpinning a scaled-up bailout for Italy, other troubled countries and, of course, Europe’s failing banks.
This proposal is somewhere between meaningless and dangerous, depending on its precise form. The good news is that it will not happen. The bad news is that no one is prepared for the real consequences of the bazooka proving to be illusory.
Steve Randy Waldman (interfluidity)
The Eurozone’s policy breakthrough? El autor recorre y vincula a las opiniones encontradas en el blogosferio acerca de cuán eficaz puede ser el nuevo pacto fiscal en la zona del euro para resolver la crisis (el consenso es que poco o cero).
Marc Chandler (Credit Writedowns)
Se divide el artículo en dos partes:
Europe’s Three No’s in Two Parts: Part I. El BCE no tomará el consejo de Fitch de respaldar la deuda de la zona del euro, pero está proveyendo abundante liquidez –más todavía ahora que extiende el plazo de los reportos a 3 años.
Under Draghi, the ECB unleashed a wave of liquidity that many in the market do not seem to fully appreciate. The cut in reserve requirements frees up 100 bln euros. The lower dollar swap rates, with the Fed, provided another $50 bln+ (38.5 bln euros). The ECB lengthened the long-term repo operation from one to 3 years.
Banks can borrow as much as they want from the central for three years at the refi rate. They are limited only by their desire and collateral. The ECB also liberalized further its definition of acceptable collateral.
LTRO
There are two auctions for the three-year long term repo operation (LTRO): December 21 and February 3. The former is arguably the most important economic event on the calendar before the end of the year.
There are two main uncertainties surrounding the December 21 operation. The first is the size—how much are banks going to borrow. The second is use—what are they going to do with the borrowed funds.
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Whereas how much banks use the 3-year facility will be known quickly, what they will do the funds will be less transparent. There are two broad courses of action. The first is a type of re-leveraging. Taking money at 1% money from the ECB and using it to buy sovereign bonds.
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Yet there are more powerful incentives in the other direction, toward de-leveraging. At the same moment that banks have an opportunity to buy sovereign bonds, the European Banking Authority is telling banks that primarily because of their exposure to sovereigns, they need to raise 115 bln euros of capital.
Europe’s Three No’s in Two Parts: Part II. La crisis tampoco se resolverá por la introducción del eurobono, ni por la desintegración de la zona del euro. Por lo tanto:
The European debt crisis is the single biggest risk facing the global economic and financial system. Investors should prepare for the continuation of the crisis, whose intensity ebbs and flows. We suggest three no’s in Europe capture the key elements of the investment climate. There will be no ECB sovereign backstop. There will be no European bond. There will be no euro zone break up. Such a climate is not supportive for the euro.