Ministros de la UE acuerdan bosquejo de mecanismo único de resolución

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

En su reunión del martes 10 de diciembre, los ministros de finanzas de la Unión Europea (Ecofin) terminaron de negociar un bosquejo del mecanismo único de resolución bancaria, uno de los pilares de la unión bancaria. Este mecanismo decide cómo liquidar bancos y a quién imponer las pérdidas resultantes. Open Europe y Peter Spiegel de FT explican lo que se ha acordado y lo que falta. En resumen, el mecanismo es el siguiente:

Primero, si un banco está en problemas y el supervisor único (el Banco Central Europeo) recomienda que se tomen medidas para gestionar el rescate o liquidación del banco, alguien debe decidir si liquidar o no el banco. ¿Quién decide? Todavía no está claro, pero será decisión compartida entre los países miembros y la Comisión Europea.

¿Quién incurrirá los costos? Una vez decidido cerrar un banco, primero se imponen pérdidas de hasta 8% de los pasivos del banco a ciertos de sus acreedores (bail-in). Sólo después de esas pérdidas, un fondo único de resolución –que hoy no existe pero que será creado poco a poco con aportaciones de los mismos bancos hasta llegar a €55 MMn en 10 años– aportará a la resolución hasta un equivalente de 5% de los pasivos del banco. Mientras ese fondo es creado, el país del banco en quiebra deberá utilizar su fondo nacional para liquidar el banco. Sólo si este fondo nacional se agota puede obtener fondos de otros países, pero hasta el límite del 5% de los pasivos del banco.

Si eso no es suficiente, o si los €55 MMn del fondo permanente se agotan, no queda claro quién sería el prestamista de última instancia –en ninguna parte del acuerdo se menciona el fondo europeo de rescate (MEDE). Decisiones finales probablemente serán tomadas por el Consejo Europeo (jefes de gobierno de la Unión Europea) en su reunión del 18-19 diciembre.

Open Europe:

What are the key points of the latest agreement?

  • The latest official draft of the plans was published early last week and things don’t seem to have changed massively.
  • A board of national resolution authorities will make recommendations on how to resolve banks (after the ECB as supervisor recommends the need for action). The Commission then decides whether the plans are adequate or not.
  • There will not be a centralised fund, at least not immediately. As in previous plans, one will be built up over the course of a decade to €55bn, through undefined levies on the financial system.
  • A network will be set up between national funds allowing them to lend to each other and take action when there is a crisis. This may be governed by a separate intergovernmental treaty, to assuage German concerns over its legality.
  • Taxpayer-backed funds remain a last resort, in particular European funds (either through the network or the ESM, the eurozone’s bailout fund), with bail-ins being the initial response. The plans for bail-ins, under the EU’s Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, could be moved forward from 2018 to 2016 to help appease Germany further.

What is still yet to be agreed?

  • Numerous points remain unclear, not least, who has the final say if the Commission and national authorities disagree. If it involves national funds, it is almost certain to be national authorities.
  • The exact process for triggering the use of funds remains unclear, particularly in a situation where the resolution process involves a large cross border bank.
  • More importantly, if a new treaty is needed, the details of this need to be thrashed out – as we saw with the fiscal compact, this can take time and will itself require a tricky negotiation. It also needs to be decided whether this will be incorporated into EU treaties, as is planned for the fiscal compact.
  • There continues to be talk of the SRM and its rules applying only to larger banks, similar to the setup of the ECB’s single supervisor.

Del comunicado de la reunión Ecofin:

Under the Council’s general approach, a minimum level of losses equal to 8% of total liabilities including own funds would have to be imposed on an institution’s shareholders and creditors before access could be granted to the resolution fund. Eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises would have preference over the claims of ordinary unsecured, non-preferred creditors and depositors from large corporations. The deposit guarantee scheme, which would always step in for covered deposits (i.e. deposits below €100,000), would have a higher ranking than eligible deposits.

Under the Council’s general approach, a contribution of the resolution fund would be capped at 5% of an institution’s total liabilities. In extraordinary circumstances, where this limit has been reached, and after all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities other than eligible deposits have been bailed in, the resolution authority could seek funding from alternative financing sources.

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