Krugman no percibe alto riesgo de crisis en economías emergentes

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

Paul Krugman no piensa que la reciente depreciación pronunciada de las monedas de economías emergentes –especialmente en Asia– presagie una crisis como la de Asia en 1997-1998 o como la de Grecia hoy. Hay menos riesgo que en el Asia de finales de los 90, argumenta, porque países como Indonesia e India tienen menos deuda externa como porcentaje del PIB de lo que tenían en los años 90 (esto lo ilustra en su blog). Y no existe el más mínimo riesgo de una crisis como la de Grecia, explica, porque, a diferencia de Grecia, estos países tienen sus propias monedas, cuya depreciación volverá más competitivas las exportaciones. Eso impulsaría una recuperación económica relativamente rápida.

The run-up to the Asian crisis bore a close family resemblance to the run-up to the crisis now afflicting Greece, Spain and other European countries. In both cases, the origins of the crisis lay in excessive private-sector optimism, with huge inflows of foreign lending going mainly to the private sector. In both cases, optimism turned to pessimism with startling speed, precipitating crisis.

Unlike Greece et al., however, the crisis countries of 1997 had their own currencies, which proceeded to drop sharply against the dollar. At first, these currency declines caused acute economic distress. In Indonesia, for example, many businesses had large dollar debts, so when the rupiah plunged against the dollar, those debts ballooned relative to assets and income. The result was a severe economic contraction, on a scale not seen since the Great Depression.

Fortunately, the bad times didn’t last all that long. The very weakness of these countries’ currencies made their exports highly competitive, and soon all of them — even Indonesia, which was hit worst — were experiencing strong export-led recoveries.

[…] Now compare this with Greece, where output is down more than 20 percent since 2007 and is still falling fast. Nobody knows when recovery will begin, and my guess is that few observers expect to see the Greek economy recover to precrisis levels this decade.

Why are things so much worse this time? One answer is that Indonesia had its own currency, and the slide in the rupiah was, eventually, a very good thing. Meanwhile, Greece is trapped in the euro. In addition, however, policy makers were more flexible in the ’90s than they are today. The International Monetary Fund initially demanded tough austerity policies in Asia, but it soon reversed course. This time, the demands placed on Greece and other debtors have been relentlessly harsh, and the more austerity fails, the more bloodletting is demanded.

So, is Asia next? Probably not. Indonesia has a much lower level of foreign debt relative to income now than it did in the 1990s. India, which also has a sliding currency that worries many observers, has even lower debt. So a repetition of the ’90s crisis, let alone a Greek-style never-ending crisis, seems unlikely.

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