Minuta BdJ: comité de política monetaria cómodo con su postura actual

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

Nuestra lectura de la minuta de reunión de política monetaria del 10-11 de julio es que el comité de política monetaria del Banco de Japón está cómodo con su postura y orientación actuales. No se discutió la posibilidad de acelerar el ritmo de estímulo monetario. El único desacuerdo fue entre un miembro que está incómodo con la promesa de mantener el relajamiento “el tiempo que fuera necesario” y los otros ocho miembros que votaron en contra de su propuesta de acotar esta orientación a un periodo de dos años. Después de la reunión del 10-11 de julio, el comité se reunió el 7-8 de agosto, cuando decidió mantener sin cambio su postura. Tendremos la minuta de esa reunión el 10 de septiembre.

El comité de política monetaria sobre la actividad económica:

Most members expressed the view that the economy was starting to recover moderately since, in the corporate sector, a virtuous cycle from income to spending appeared to have gradually started operating as the level of economic activity had been rising moderately on the back of the resilience in domestic demand together with the pick-up in exports.[…]

As for the outlook for the economy, members shared the view that the economy was likely to recover moderately on the back of the resilience in domestic demand and the pick-up in overseas economies.

Sobre las expectativas para la inflación:

As for inflation expectations, members shared the recognition that, although the rise in some market indicators had come to a pause, considering the results of surveys conducted on firms, households, and economists — including the diffusion index for output prices in the June 2013 Tankan — indicators suggested a rise in such expectations on the whole. One member expressed the view that it remained difficult to identify the effects of perceptions regarding the likelihood of the consumption tax hikes on developments in these indicators. A different member pointed out that, according to the Bank’s Opinion Survey on the General Public’s Views and Behavior, the proportion of respondents who expected that prices “will go up” one year from the time of the survey had increased to about 80 percent.[…]

With regard to the forecasts of prices in the baseline scenario, members shared the view that the forecasts for the year-on-year rate of change in the CPI (all items less fresh food) were broadly in line with those presented in the April 2013 Outlook Report. Most members were of the view that the year-on-year rate of change in the CPI was likely to follow a rising trend, reflecting factors such as the improvement in the aggregate supply and demand balance as well as the rise in medium- to long-term inflation expectations, and that it was likely to reach around 2 percent — the price stability target — toward the latter half of the projection period, spanning from fiscal 2014 through fiscal 2015. […] As was the case when the April 2013 Outlook Report had been discussed, a few members held a more cautious view of the outlook for prices compared with the forecasts in the baseline scenario, mainly because it seemed highly uncertain whether changes in inflation expectations would lead to a rise in the actual rate of inflation.

Sobre la conducta futura de la política monetaria, un miembro (Takahide Kiuchi) se sentía incómodo con la promesa de mantener el relajamiento cuantitativo y cualitativo “el tiempo que fuera necesario” y quiso acotar esa orientación a un periodo de dos años. Los otros ocho miembros votaron en contra de esta propuesta.

With respect to the future conduct of monetary policy, most members shared the view that the Bank would continue with quantitative and qualitative monetary easing, aiming to achieve the price stability target of 2 percent, as long as it was necessary for maintaining this target in a stable manner. These members continued that, in doing so, it would examine both upside and downside risks to economic activity and prices, and make adjustments as appropriate. In response to this view, one member expressed concern that, in a situation where it seemed difficult to achieve the price stability target in about two years, if a rise were to occur in markets’ anticipation that quantitative and qualitative monetary easing would continue for a protracted period or extreme additional measures would be implemented, this could lead to economic instability in the medium to long term, such as through a buildup of financial imbalances. On this basis, this member said that it was appropriate to change the expression representing the Bank’s commitment by stating that the time frame for continuing quantitative and qualitative monetary easing should be restricted to about two years, and that thereafter the Bank would review the monetary easing measures in a flexible manner. In response to this, a few members said that such a change in the expression representing the Bank’s commitment could lead to the unintended consequence of weakening monetary easing effects.

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