Bernanke no dio indicios fuertes de QE3

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

En su discurso en Jackson Hole (pdf), Ben Bernanke explicó las medidas que ha tomado la Fed desde la crisis de 2007-2008 y discutió los beneficios y costos (inciertos) de los programas de compras masivas de activos (QE). Aunque no dio ningún indicio directo de que planea lanzar QE3 en la reunión de política monetaria del 13 de septiembre, sus argumentos parecieron señalar que no se sentiría demasiado incómodo haciéndolo si fuera necesario. Creemos que habrá algún tipo de estímulo el 13 de septiembre, aunque no sabemos si será a través de un QE3.

Explicó que las medidas que expandieron el balance de la Fed tuvieron un impacto significativo para la economía. (Nota: LSAP = large-scale asset purchases, o compras masivas de activos.)

How effective are balance sheet policies? After nearly four years of experience with large-scale asset purchases, a substantial body of empirical work on their effects has emerged. Generally, this research finds that the Federal Reserve’s large-scale purchases have significantly lowered long-term Treasury yields. […] Three studies considering the cumulative influence of all the Federal Reserve’s asset purchases, including those made under the MEP, found total effects between 80 and 120 basis points on the 10-year Treasury yield. These effects are economically meaningful.

Importantly, the effects of LSAPs do not appear to be confined to longer-term Treasury yields. Notably, LSAPs have been found to be associated with significant declines in the yields on both corporate bonds and MBS.

Considera uno por uno los costos potenciales de las compras masivas de activos, pero ninguno parece preocuparle demasiado. Esto ya lo habíamos visto en discursos anteriores, y son la razón por la que pensamos que no tendría ningún problema en lanzar una tercera ronda de QE.

One possible cost of conducting additional LSAPs is that these operations could impair the functioning of securities markets. […] Conceivably, if the Federal Reserve became too dominant a buyer in certain segments of these markets, trading among private agents could dry up, degrading liquidity and price discovery… However, although market capacity could ultimately become an issue, to this point we have seen few if any problems in the markets for Treasury or agency securities, private-sector holdings of securities remain large, and trading among private market participants remains robust.

A second potential cost of additional securities purchases is that substantial further expansions of the balance sheet could reduce public confidence in the Fed’s ability to exit smoothly from its accommodative policies at the appropriate time. […] It is noteworthy, however, that the expansion of the balance sheet to date has not materially affected inflation expectations, likely in part because of the great emphasis the Federal Reserve has placed on developing tools to ensure that we can normalize monetary policy when appropriate, even if our securities holdings remain large.

[…] A third cost to be weighed is that of risks to financial stability. For example, some observers have raised concerns that, by driving longer-term yields lower, nontraditional policies could induce an imprudent reach for yield by some investors and thereby threaten financial stability. Of course, one objective of both traditional and nontraditional policy during recoveries is to promote a return to productive risk-taking; as always, the goal is to strike the appropriate balance. Moreover, a stronger recovery is itself clearly helpful for financial stability. In assessing this risk, it is important to note that the Federal Reserve, both on its own and in collaboration with other members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, has substantially expanded its monitoring of the financial system and modified its supervisory approach to take a more systemic perspective. We have seen little evidence thus far of unsafe buildups of risk or leverage, but we will continue both our careful oversight and the implementation of financial regulatory reforms aimed at reducing systemic risk.

A fourth potential cost of balance sheet policies is the possibility that the Federal Reserve could incur financial losses should interest rates rise to an unexpected extent. Extensive analyses suggest that, from a purely fiscal perspective, the odds are strong that the Fed’s asset purchases will make money for the taxpayers, reducing the federal deficit and debt. And, of course, to the extent that monetary policy helps strengthen the economy and raise incomes, the benefits for the U.S. fiscal position would be substantial. In any case, this purely fiscal perspective is too narrow: Because Americans are workers and consumers as well as taxpayers, monetary policy can achieve the most for the country by focusing generally on improving economic performance rather than narrowly on possible gains or losses on the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet.

Concluye que los costos son inciertos y variables, pero que se pueden controlar y que no se debe descartar el uso futuro de LSAP.

Su perspectiva económica es en general negativa. Observa que la inflación se ha mantenido cerca del objetivo y que algunos sectores se han fortalecido (manufactura, vivienda, comercio internacional, inversión empresarial en equipo y software) y que las condiciones de los mercados de crédito y financieros han mejorado desde 2007-2008. Sin embargo, está bastante insatisfecho con la situación actual. Cree que el mercado laboral sólo mejorará con tasas de crecimiento económico mayores a su tendencia de largo plazo:

The unemployment rate remains more than 2 percentage points above what most FOMC participants see as its longer-run normal value, and other indicators–such as the labor force participation rate and the number of people working part time for economic reasons–confirm that labor force utilization remains at very low levels. Further, the rate of improvement in the labor market has been painfully slow. I have noted on other occasions that the declines in unemployment we have seen would likely continue only if economic growth picked up to a rate above its longer-term trend. In fact, growth in recent quarters has been tepid, and so, not surprisingly, we have seen no net improvement in the unemployment rate since January. Unless the economy begins to grow more quickly than it has recently, the unemployment rate is likely to remain far above levels consistent with maximum employment for some time.

Argumenta, como lo ha hecho antes, que no cree que la pobre recuperación se explique por factores estructurales. La implicación es que todavía hay lugar para más medidas de estímulo. Note su poca emoción por las señales recientes de mejoría en el sector vivienda.

[…] Rather than attributing the slow recovery to longer-term structural factors, I see growth being held back currently by a number of headwinds. First, although the housing sector has shown signs of improvement, housing activity remains at low levels and is contributing much less to the recovery than would normally be expected at this stage of the cycle.

Second, fiscal policy, at both the federal and state and local levels, has become an important headwind for the pace of economic growth… Uncertainties about fiscal policy, notably about the resolution of the so-called fiscal cliff and the lifting of the debt ceiling, are probably also restraining activity, although the magnitudes of these effects are hard to judge.

[…] Third, stresses in credit and financial markets continue to restrain the economy. Earlier in the recovery, limited credit availability was an important factor holding back growth, and tight borrowing conditions for some potential homebuyers and small businesses remain a problem today. More recently, however, a major source of financial strains has been uncertainty about developments in Europe.

Termina expresando su angustia por el estancamiento en el mercado laboral y diciendo que la Fed continuará proveyendo relajamiento monetario para impulsar una recuperación económica más fuerte y una mejoría sostenida en el mercado laboral.

[…] As we assess the benefits and costs of alternative policy approaches, though, we must not lose sight of the daunting economic challenges that confront our nation. The stagnation of the labor market in particular is a grave concern not only because of the enormous suffering and waste of human talent it entails, but also because persistently high levels of unemployment will wreak structural damage on our economy that could last for many years.

Over the past five years, the Federal Reserve has acted to support economic growth and foster job creation, and it is important to achieve further progress, particularly in the labor market. Taking due account of the uncertainties and limits of its policy tools, the Federal Reserve will provide additional policy accommodation as needed to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability.

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